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In this era of social media, popular narratives have increasingly important implications on 
domestic policy and bilateral relations. In part based on the video of making Kimchi published by 
a famous Chinese YouTuber, this study analyzes Chinese and Korean netizens’ opinions of each 
other by examining around one thousand social media posts, which offer a glimpse of the unique 
cultural confrontation between China and South Korea. By revealing the complexity of China-
Korea relations through a social media lens, my analysis provides new insights into the 
implications of these popular narratives on China’s policymaking. Even as an authoritarian regime, 
the Chinese government has started to pay attention to and respond to netizens’ public opinions. It 
is still difficult to assess how the generally negative view of Chinese and Koreans towards one 
another will shape the future and if those with more positive views will increase in number. In any 
case, the intense, combative dialogue on social media serves as an important reference point and a 
cautionary warning—that the Chinese and Korean governments need to make policies that are 
conducive to sustainable bilateral relations and the Asia Pacific stability.  
 



















In the past ten years, the cultural disputes and cultural confrontations between China and 
Korea are increasing significantly: South Korea appropriated and used the Dragon Boat Festival, 
a traditional Chinese festival, as a means of World Intangible Cultural Heritage1 for their own 
country; Li Ziqi, an influential YouTuber with 14.6 million subscribers published a video at the 
end of  2020 about how to make Kimchi, which led to the intense online debate about which 
country Kimchi originates from; the famous Chinese cartoonist “Old Xian” (Old先)was accused 
by Korean netizens of stealing the design of Korean consumes on his cartoon works published on 
Twitter on Nov. 1st, 2020; a Chinese screenwriter fought with Korean netizens when they accused 
him of appropriating Korean traditional consumes in his upcoming television series. Among those 
confrontations, the “Kimchi war” aroused intense online discussion domestically and abroad. The 
narratives from Chinese and Korean netizens are in direct conflict with the friendly, welcoming 
official narratives of the Chinese and Korean governments. In a world connected by social 
networks, the question of whether or not such large-scale online contention will damage China-
Korea relations is one arousing many people’s curiosity, including mine.  
China and Korea have a longstanding strategic and economic partnership, deep-rooted 
cultural similarities, and a close emotional bond, which traditionally has made China-Korea 
 
1 “The ‘intangible cultural heritage’ means the practices, representations, expressions, knowledge, skills—
as well as the instruments, objects, artefacts and cultural spaces associated therewith—that communities, groups and, 
in some cases, individuals recognize as part of their cultural heritage. This intangible cultural heritage, transmitted 
from generation to generation, is constantly recreated by communities and groups in response to their environment, 
their interaction with nature and their history, and provides them with a sense of identity and continuity, thus 
promoting respect for cultural diversity and human creativity.” – UNESCO, “What is the intangible cultural heritage?”, 
last accessed on Apr.28, 2021, https://ich.unesco.org/en/what-is-intangible-heritage-00003. 
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relations solid as a rock. In the past, Korea was protected by China from aggression by other ethnic 
groups. Trade and people’s exchange brought the Chinese civilization to the ancient Korea, such 
as printing, food, medicine, philosophical thoughts, which not only boosted economic and political 
development in Korea, but also laid the foundation of Korean’s modernity. In contemporary times, 
China and South Korea are closely connected with each other through political partnership, trade, 
and cultural exchange. Therefore, for China, where policies are always made by the elite class, 
netizens’ opinions and their impact on China’s foreign policy towards South Korea—and even 
future regional cooperation—is sometimes difficult to assess. It seems that the complexity of 
Korea’s peninsula security pattern and the Sino-U.S. relationship are the main factors in changing 
China-Korea relations rather than cultural confrontation. However, the Chinese spokeswoman of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded to the intense debate between Chinese and Korean 
netizens over the origin of Kimchi on January 20, 2021, which signaled that the Chinese 
government was interested in what netizens said about South Korea on social media. More 
importantly, the Chinese government has started to regard social media as a vehicle that reflects 
people’s wishes and demands and seems to think that responding to views expressed on social 
media is an effective way to maintain a close relationship between the CPC and people.  
Because Chinese citizens feel suppressed or fearful of expressing their opinions in public, 
social media has become a platform where they feel safer and freer to express themselves. For 
China, with its strict online censorship, netizens are more likely to discuss cultural and social issues 
rather than even more sensitive political and economic issues. Moreover, the popularity of social 
media makes it the new battlefield for countries to shape their national image and show national 
power. While Koreans are less afraid of criticizing the government, social media is an easy, 
accessible communication system. Concerning the future bilateral relations between China and 
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South Korea, intense online spats caused by cultural confrontation will only increase, which will 
put more pressure on Chinese policymakers. Moreover, the popular narratives in social media may 
be used as a leverage to gain an upper hand, seize initiative in the negotiations, and reap greater 
benefits. These are why the popular narratives are becoming critical factors in international 
competition and can’t be ignored even by an authoritarian regime. 
This project examines popular discourse on social media about the cultural confrontation 
between China and South Korea through content and statistical analysis of YouTube comments 
and Weibo posts. This complex cultural relationship is analyzed through various conceptual frames. 
First, I examine how the countries ridicule each other and label their people as “culture thieves”; 
second, this study looks at each country’s critique of the other’s ideologies—with China accusing 
Korea of acting as a watchdog for western countries and Korea criticizing China for violation of 
human rights and democracy because of its communist and authoritarian rule; third, this project 
explores the policy recommendations Chinese netizens gave to the Chinese government to stop 
Korea’s cultural appropriation and gain more advantages in Chinese-Korean relations; finally, this 
study reflects upon the positive voices in this hostile confrontation. With these multi-layered 
dynamics and ongoing issues, China-South Korea relations may become even more complicated 
for the foreseeable future.  
 
Chinese-Korean Social Media Relations: Causes of the Confrontation and Emerging Social 
Media 
Previous research tends to focus on the ways in which China and South Korea are linked 
together in mutually beneficial ways. Scott Synder asserts that “despite political and diplomatic 
tensions, the fundamental complementary nature of the Chinese and South Korean economies 
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continues to create mutual beneficial opportunities.”2 It is of necessity for them to cooperate with 
one another because of their common interests.3 Xiaoxiong Yi points out that “China and South 
Korea have mutual economic and strategic interests, the potential for the cooperation is immense. 
China is adjusting his Korean policy depending on everchanging peninsula security pattern to 
ensure its strategic interests.”4  
However, as this confrontation develops, there is increased scholarship that centers on the 
conflict between China and South Korea. This conflict often focuses on cultural appropriation and 
socioeconomic impact. Scott Snyder and See-Won Byun (2021) points out that “fueled by social 
media, Beijing and Seoul’s history controversy uncovered a much wider clash of identities at the 
societal level.”5 Chinese and Korean’ contradicting thoughts about culture and history has incited 
the outrages of netizens in two countries. They were inclined to attribute those disputes to “culture 
takeover” or “economic coercion.”6 In another study, Guozhong Li, Eun-Mi Park and Seong-Taek 
Park (2015) conclude that social media is important in the “forming of country image which is the 
source of competitiveness.”7 Using data analysis of PLS (Partial Least Square), they learned that 
numbers of social media users in China and image of Korea are positively correlated. Using social 
 
2 Scott Synder, “Clash, Crash and Cash: Core Realities in the Sino-Korean Relationship,” Comparative 
Connections 4, no.2, (July 2002): 5. 
 
3 Synder, 5-6. 
 
4 Xiaoxiong, Yi, “Ten Years of China-South Korea Relations and Beijing's View on Korean Reunification,” 
The Journal of East Asia Affairs 16, no.2 (Fall/Winter 2002): 351. 
 
5 Scott Snyder and See-Won Byun, “Strategic Dilemmas, Clashing Identities, and Free Trade,” 
Comparative Connections 22, no.3 (Jan 2021): 110-111. 
 
6 Scott Snyder and See-Won Byun, 110-111. 
 
7 Guozhong Li, Eun-Mi Park and Seong-Taek Park, “Effects of social media usage on country image and 
purchase intention from social P2P network perspective,” Peer-to-Peer Networking & Applications 9, no. 3 (May 
2016): 488. 
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media, the “general image of a specific nation positively influences purchasing products of the 
nation.”8  
According to the Fewsmith and Rosen, “The place of public opinion in China’s foreign 
policy is a common yet controversial research topic.”9 China’s foreign policy, thought to be 
immune to online public opinion, is increasingly influenced by it. Thomas Olsen-Boyd (2019) 
argues that “social media sentiment is forcing the hand of the Chinese government in a way that 
may not necessarily be in line with government policy.”10 With the widespread use of social media 
in China, the Chinese government has to react to public opinion online. After the “century of 
humiliation,” Chinese people are sensitive about any attempt to humiliate China; moreover, the 
Chinese government “will tolerate venting frustration towards foreign entities that cannot normally 
be publicly articulated towards their own government.”11  In terms of China-Korea relations, 
cultural clashes attract more attention from the masses and people are more likely to comment on 
these relevant issues, because compared to political and economic issues, culture is perceived as 
more interesting, less political sensitive, and closer to our lives.  
To date, there has been some analysis of the impact of social media on these bilateral 
relations and China’s foreign policy toward South Korea. These studies, however, tend to hone in 
on specific aspects of the conflict rather than giving a holistic analysis. Some authors assert that 
“public opinion and netizens’ opinions forced the Chinese government to respond and was even 
 
8Guozhong Li, Eun-Mi Park and Seong-Taek Park, 494. 
 
9 Andrew Scobell, Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, Astrid Cevallos, Arthur Chan, and Zev Winkelman, 
“Netizen Opinion and China's Foreign Policy: Interpreting Narratives about North Korea on Chinese Social Media,” 
Asia Policy 14, no. 3 (July 2019): 99. 
 
10 Thomas Olsen-Boyd, “Stockholm Syndrome: social media can shape China’s foreign policy,” Lowy 
Institute, March 28, 2019, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/stockholm-syndrome-social-media-can-
shape-china-s-foreign-policy. 
 
11 See note 10 above. 
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used to gain more benefits from the North Korea.”12 Public opinion plays an increasingly important 
role in shaping the policies of China toward Japan13 and the Unites States,14 and is even leveraged 
by the Chinese government as a bargaining chip to accrue more benefits. A more in-depth analysis 
will be helpful to look at how social media magnifies cultural conflicts. My research delves further 
into these recent highly contested cultural disputes and examine how social media integrates into 
social frameworks and impacts foreign policy. On social media, netizens have a platform to voice 
opinions, which has major implications in terms of politics, economics and culture. As the Chinese 
government attaches more importance to public opinion on social media, netizens’ narratives will 
become an effective tool to achieve political goals.    
 
Using Social Media Posts and Comments to Analyze Popular Narratives 
With the development of digital technology and globalization, social networks have 
integrated into the daily lives of those in China and South Korea. According to the most updated 
data, “South Korea’s social media penetration rate has reached 87 percent, the third highest among 
nations around the globe.”15 There were 45.79 million social media users in South Korea in 
January 2021, “equivalent to 89.3% of the total population in January 2021.”16 In democratic 
Korea, Korean people feel free to voice their opinions and comments on policies and regulations 
 
12 Andrew Scobell, Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, Astrid Cevallos, Arthur Chan, and Zev Winkelman, 99. 
 
13 James Reilly, Strong Society, Smart State: The Rise of Public Opinion in China’s Japan Policy (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2011). 
 
14 Daniela Stockmann, Media Commercialization and Authoritarian Rule in China (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012). 
 
15 Woo-hyun, Shim, “Korea’s social media penetration rate ranks third in world,” The Korea Herald, Sep. 
7, 2020, http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20200907000815. 
 
16 Simon Kemp, “Digital 2021: South Korea,” Datareportal, last modified Feb.11, 2021, 
https://datareportal.com/reports/digital-2021-south-
korea#:~:text=There%20were%2045.79%20million%20social,total%20population%20in%20January%202021. 
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through which they can participate in the realms of politics and social issues. Korean government 
regards social media and netizens’ opinions as an important channel to discern public attitudes.  
With the increased popularity of Weibo and WeChat, social media is becoming an essential 
way for the Chinese government to supervise and monitor popular discourse with a focus on public 
attitudes toward policies and regulations. By December 2020, about 989 million people had access 
to the internet in China,17 and 175 million of them were under 18 years old.18 Over 680 million of 
these netizens were adults with at least a high school degree and from an urban area.19 Sina Weibo 
(“Weibo” hereafter), controlled by Alibaba Group, is widely used by Chinese netizens as a social 
media platform for current news, entertainment, and public expression. Although there is strict 
censorship of online expression, social media and online platforms still offer a relatively authentic 
and candid means for Chinese popular discourse. The platforms also depict a realistic picture of 
the national image of these countries and the effectiveness of cultural policies. 
Compared with previous studies that selected specific posts to support their arguments, my 
analysis reviews a wide range of data from social media platforms to create a more holistic picture. 
In order to reflect the authentic popular discourse, I collected as much data as I could regardless 




17 “The 47th Statistical Report on Internet Development in China,” China Internet Network Information 
Center, February 2021, https://www.cnnic.net.cn/hlwfzyj/hlwxzbg/hlwtjbg/202102/P020210203334633480104.pdf. 
 
18 “The Statistical Report on Internet Juvenile Users in China 2019,” Division of Juvenile rights protection 
of Central Committee of the Communist Youth League and China Internet Network Information Center, May 2020, 
https://www.cnnic.net.cn/hlwfzyj/hlwxzbg/qsnbg/202005/P020200513370410784435.pdf. 
 
19 China Internet Network Information Center, “The 47th Statistical Report on Internet Development in 
China.” 
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My goal in collecting this data is to gain a deeper understanding of the popular discourses 
in both China and South Korea surrounding Kimchi’s origin, the most discussed online cultural 
confrontation. I have collected 103 posts made on Weibo from December 1st, 2020 to March 31st, 
2021 and selected 977 comments from the video “the last episode of the ‘Life Series’: The life of 
White Radish” published by Li Ziqi on Jan. 9th, 2021. Each post or comment contains one term, or 
several terms related to Kimchi’s origin, China’s cultural appropriation, cultural theft, and 
ideological attacks on each other. Table 1 and Table 2 show 977 useful comments from 977 
accounts that I selected from 336,000 YouTube comments to ensure a diversity of comments and 
avoid too much overlap and repetition. Table 3 shows the 103 posts from Weibo. 
 
Content Analysis 
I analyzed and coded every post or comment by relevance and topic. First, I coded a post 
as relevant if it discussed cultural appropriation, ideology, and policy recommendations related to 
China and South Korea. Second, I coded and categorized relevant posts according to a variety of 
themes, as follows: 
1) Kimchi is a Chinese food or Korean food;  
2) critique of Chinese ideology;  
3) Korean cultural independence;  
4) Xinjiang and Hongkong and other sensitive issues in China;  
5) sarcastic comments or posts;  
6) ridicule of Korean’s scarcity of resources; and  
7) ridicule of Koreans’ lack of knowledge of history and policy recommendations.  
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Results  
In my total of 1080 samples, 2.4% (26 samples) were coded as positive, while 97.6% (1054 
samples) were coded as unfavorable. All of the samples from the YouTube comments were 
negative, accounting for 90.46% of 1080 samples. Samples from Weibo, which reflected the public 
attitudes of Chinese netizens, show different popular discourses from YouTube comments: 70.64% 
were coded as unfavorable, while 29.36% were positive. Ruling out the influence of other factors, 
including fifty-cent party, online army,20 third-party’s intervention,21 some netizens from both 
China and Korea highlighted the importance of China-Korea friendship. This finding is an 
essential foundation to repair and reconcile the bilateral relationship damaged by frequent online 
confrontations and negative popular narratives.   
The “Kimchi War” is a cultural confrontation based on each country’s own form of 
nationalism, need for cultural independence and strategic considerations. Although some 
comments on social media are too irrational to reference, they still offer essential glimpses into 
China-Korea relations, which are not as good as what Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi claimed 
when stating the countries are “friends who look after each other in times of trouble.”22  Netizen 
narratives reveal a tension between public opinion and the government’s official stance. Although 
these discourses might have little influence on China’s foreign policy towards South Korea, 
China’s official response and commentaries on government “mouthpieces” reveal that it is still of 
relevance to the CPC leaders. As public opinion shapes the policy of democratic Korea, China will 
 
20  Fifty-cent party and online army are groups supported by the Chinese government. The groups are 
responsible for supervising the popular narratives and posting favorable words regarding the government. 
 
21 Among the comments on the Li Ziqi’s YouTube video, there are lots of comments written in traditional 
Chinese, which criticize the Chinese government and foment the dissent of both Chinese and Korean netizens. 
 
22 During a tour of Northeast Asia in 2020, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi used the phrase “shou wang 
xiang zhu” to describe the China-Korea relations, means China and South Korea should be “friends who look after 
each other in times of trouble.” 
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probably face pressure from Korea as they feel mounting pressure from the ever-intense online 
conflict. Therefore, with nearly 1 billion net users today in China, the CPC will have to respond 
and adjust their policies rather than ignored what citizens say as they have sometimes done in the 
past.  
 
Interpretation of Major Discourse on South Korea and China 
Based on the data I collected, the major discourses of Chinese netizens on South Korea 
related to the online confrontation over Kimchi consisted of three narratives: accusations towards 
South Korea of “cultural thief”; critiques of South Korea’s betrayal of Chinese-Korean friendship 
and its fawning over the western countries; policy recommendations on how to deal with China-
Korea relations, including economic sanctions, military coercion, hard-core foreign policy. On the 
Korean side, the popular narratives of Korean netizens focus on China’s cultural appropriation; 
critique of China’s ideology and sensitive issues; and the importance of keeping a good 
relationship with China. While comments sometimes overlap into more than one category, I chose 
to code the comment based on the content that is most emphasized. 
 
Table 1 Coded Chinese Netizens’ YouTube Comments on South Korea 
Theme Comments % of Total 
Korea: Country as a thief 143 39.39 
“Kimchi is Chinese” 29 7.99 
Ridicule of South Korea 191 52.62 
TOTAL 363 100 
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Table 2 Coded Korean Netizens’ YouTube Comments on China 
Theme Comments % of Total 
China: Cultural Appropriation 54 8.79 
“Kimchi is Korean” 147 23.94 
Critique of China’s ideology 109 17.75 
China’s sensitive issues: Xinjiang, Tiananmen, COVID-19,etc 108 17.59 
Mocking China 196 31.92 
TOTAL 614 100 
 
Table 3 Coded Weibo Posts on Origin of Kimchi and South Korea 
Theme Comments % of Total 
Accusations: Cultural Thief 48 46.60 
“Country as a thief” 24 23.30 
Korean’s not confident in its own culture 8 7.77 
lack of knowledge of history 16 15.53 
Policy recommendation 19 18.45 
Chinese should protect Chinese culture 14 13.59 
China-Korea cooperation 4 3.88 
Enhance the strength 1 0.97 
Mocking and Satire (hate Korean, watchdog of US, 
narrow-minded, sanctions) 
29 28.16 
  14 
Kimchi is Korean food 3 2.91 
Korean should be rational and respect history 2 1.94 
“not a big deal, just a misunderstanding of Paocai 
and Kimchi” 
2 1.94 
Total 103 100 
 
 
Cultural Thieves: Accusations Towards One Other 
In many posts, netizens accuse each other of cultural appropriation. Chinese netizens gives 
South Korea the “nickname” of a “country of thieves,” mocking them for appropriating Chinese 
culture, including traditional costumes, food, and books. Compared with the general negative 
attitude of South Koreans, Chinese netizens are more inclined to use intense even insulting words: 
among the terms frequently used in YouTube comments and Weibo posts are “country of thief” 
(tou guo), “country of coldness” (han guo), “country of hell and coldness” (dahan minguo), 
“watchdog of the West” (xifang de zougou), as well as “small country” (danwan zhidi), “former 
colony of Japan” (riben de zhimindi).  
Many posts by some famous Weibo accounts mock the idea that Korea is not a truly 
independent country throughout history. It used to be the vassal state of China, the colony of Japan 
and one of the military bases of the U.S. at present. As a result, they had to appropriate other 
countries’ cultures and pretended itself as a country with a diverse culture. One post cites kimchi 
as the side dish in China: 
The thing in different cultures means differently. For example, in Northeast China, kimchi 
can’t be served on the table when people invite friends for dinner because it is a side dish 
or appetizer; in South Korea, it is a national food. It means nothing to China, but it means 
significantly to South Korea. “A country, if without politeness and insult his important 
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neighbor, will die in the end.” South Korea should learn Chinese because the first 
constitution of South Korea was written in Chinese.23 
 
This post was reposted and commented over several thousand times. On one hand, it shows that 
Chinese people are very proud of the diversity of Chinese culture; on the other hand, Chinese 
netizens infer that Korean netizens are ridiculous to argue with them because Korean culture 
borrows a lot from Chinese culture. Without Chinese culture, there is no Korean culture, not to 
mention Kimchi.  
Some netizens speculate as to why Koreans would like to “steal” Chinese culture and 
conclude that Korea is not confident in its own culture and would not like to admit the significant 
influence of China on Korean society. That a Chinese making Kimchi raises such an intense spat 
makes many Chinese confused: they don’t think it is a big deal and can’t understand why Koreans 
are so sensitive. One post comments that the “export of Chinese culture in Tang Dynasty and Ming 
Dynasty have a great influence on the development of Korea but the success of the economy makes 
Korea start to get rid of the trace of Chinese culture.”24 Another post states that Korea has been 
trying de-Chinesization since Chosen Dynasty by inventing Hangul, manifesting the notion that 
since the Chosen Dynasty, Korean people have struggled to get rid of Chinese influence and built 
up a unique Korean identity. However, denying the cultural connection between two countries 
only causes animosity. A Chinese netizen posted this comment:  
What a joke! Do Korean have a culture? We Chinese made Paocai (Kimchi) thousands of 
years ago. Cabbage, the raw material of Kimchi, is originated from China, not to mention 
 
23 Xia, Zhu (@Zhuxia-CityChannel), “I am a tough lady from Northeast China, Kimchi is a side dish to 
me,” Weibo, Jan. 13, 2021, 
https://weibo.com/lrtvzx?refer_flag=1005055013_&ssl_rnd=1616185749.5196&is_all=1. 
 
24 Yangzheng Gongkaike (@Yangzheng Gongkaike), “Korea’s inferiority complex and confuse about 
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Kimchi. It is ridiculous for Korean to claim Kimchi as their own cultural product. Do 
Korean know history?25   
 
Some Chinese netizens, like this one, relate Korean cultural appropriation with their lack 
of knowledge of history. They list lots of historical facts, including how Chinese people had written 
down how to make Kimchi in the Analects and thus mocking Korean peoples’ ignorance; and that 
the raw material of Kimchi, cabbage, was also imported from China since Ming Dynasty. One post 
states: “Korean netizens are a group of people who are ignorant, narrow-minded, and 
stubborn . . .The Analects had recorded the method of making Kimchi in Shang Dynasty (1600-
1046 B.C.) . . . Korean netizens should’ve gone to school and learned history.”26 
Most Korean netizens firmly claim that “Kimchi is Korean” and ridicule China as a 
“cultural thief” regarding Kimchi as Chinese food. They accuse the Chinese of cultural 
appropriation by “stealing” Kimchi, Hanbok, and traditional festivals. Like Chinese netizens’ 
aggressive responses, most Korean netizens use intense words to express their anger. Among the 
words that they use frequently in the comments and posts are “Kimchi is Korean,” “apologize,” 
“thief,” “Korean culture.” Some of them show anger about the name of this video27 “Chinese food” 
and list several reasons “why kimchi is Korean food other than Chinese”: first, in Korea, there is 
a refrigerator designed for storing Kimchi, called “Kimchi refrigerator”; second, there are several 
 
25 Haishishenlou Jieshuo (@Haishishenlou Jieshuo), “Liziqi was strongly criticized by korean netizens for 





26 Xiaochu fuji de meishaonv (@Xiaochu fuji de meishaonv), “Liziqi was criticized by Korean netizens for 





27 “The last episode of the ‘Life Series’: The life of white radish” published by Li Ziqi on YouTube, Jan. 
9th, 2021, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B6bJ_vTslyo.  
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hundreds of kinds of Kimchi, made from cabbage, radish, cucumber, pepper, sweet potato, and 
eggplant; third, Kimchi is the symbol of Korea and Korean culture and is recognized by the global 
society. Unlike Chinese netizens, Korean netizens rarely discussed or debated the historical origin 
of Kimchi and the history of the bilateral relationship between China and Korea. Their avoidance 
of this topic was attacked by the Chinese, who said Koreans lacked intelligence and self-
confidence.   
 
Ideology: Watchdog and Authoritarian Regime 
Another major theme that frequently occurs in YouTube comments and Weibo is the 
critique of each other’s ideologies. China netizens criticize Korea of acting as a watchdog for 
western countries and betraying the friendship which has lasted for hundreds of years. Korean 
netizens criticize China for its human rights issues, authoritarianism, and communism. According 
to them, China’s cultural appropriation speaks to the weaknesses of communism and authoritarian 
regimes, such as no democratic system and freedom of speech. In addition, some Korean netizens 
assert that cultural aggression towards neighbors is an important way for China to extend its 
influence in the Asia Pacific region. In the meantime, Chinese netizens mock and ridicule Korea’s 
“amnesia”: to become a “loyal friend” of western countries, especially the United States and Japan 
after the Korean War (1950-1953), it turns a blind eye to the history of “Comfort Women” in the 
2nd World War and the U.S. army base in Camp Humphreys.  
In the samples I coded, Korean netizens attack China’s authoritarian regime. One post, for 
instance, notes sarcastically that “China is a country full of lies, pride, supervision over people, 
unsanitary places and counterfeit products.”28 Many users point out that the Chinese government 
 
28 Xi Jin Pooh, comment on Li Ziqi, “The last episode of the “Life Series”: The life of white radish!” Mar. 
23, 2021. 
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poses strict censorship and supervision on social media and people’s comments, making it lose 
people’s support gradually. They even assert that Li Ziqi is sponsored by the government and acts 
as a tool to extend the Chinese cultural influence on the whole world. Moreover, many Korean net 
users claim China used this video29 to agitate the confrontation between Chinese and Korean 
people to achieve its political goals. One post declares that “Four years ago, China boycotted 
kimchi to protest against South Korea's THAAD deployment. Kimchi cannot be written in Chinese 
letters. ISO also said that paocai is not kimchi. The Chinese don't know about government’s 
brainwashing education.”30 
Korean netizens also express dissatisfaction with how the CPC regime deals with Xinjiang 
Muslims, Hong Kong, the spread of COVID-19 and other sensitive political and human rights 
issues. They criticize the way the CPC treated the patriotic students in the democratic movement 
in Tiananmen Square 1989 and Muslims in Xinjiang, condemning them for taking away Hong 
Kong’s democracy, and denouncing China’s for not taking responsibility for the COVID-19 
worldwide breakout. Such posts include “Kimchi is from Korea, COVID is from China.” 31 
Another one states: “I’m really sorry for the Uighurs who are dominated by the Chinese 
government.”32 
Some Chinese net users criticize Korea’s loyalty to western countries as a sign that they 
are a watchdog for the United States and claim that Korea exchanged independence for the 
 
29 “The last episode of the ‘Life Series’: The life of white radish” published by Li Ziqi on YouTube, Jan. 
9th, 2021, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B6bJ_vTslyo.  
 
30 Baldwood bad, comment on Li Ziqi, “The last episode of the “Life Series”: The life of white radish!” 
Mar. 20, 2021. 
 
31 일회용계정, comment on Li Ziqi, “The last episode of the “Life Series”: The life of white radish!” 
Mar.22, 2021. 
 
32 원준이, comment on Li Ziqi, “The last episode of the “Life Series”: The life of white radish!” Apr.7, 
2021. 
  19 
protection of the United States by allowing the existence of a US army base and intervention from 
the US on domestic affairs. One post state, “Korea was the vassal state of China in the past, is the 
colony of the US at present.”33 Another post claims, “US soldiers committed crimes on South 
Korea territory, but Korean government has no right to punish them. South Korea is the slave of 
US.”34 Moreover, some users argue that Korea criticized China for cultural stealing for making up 
to the US’s complaint about China’s IP theft.  One user writes that “the US said China stole their 
technology, so Korean said China stole their Kimchi. It is ridiculous.”35 Most Chinese netizens 
seem to believe that Korea and western countries work closely to oppose and defame China and 
thus feel disappointed about South Korea. Moreover, the deployment of THAAD and South Korea-
US joint military practices make the Chinese government and Chinese people feel betrayed. Angry 
Chinese people attack Korea for putting China and Chinese people under the watch of the United 
States and mock them for having no dignity: in order to be a loyal ally of the U.S., they said, Korea 
has sacrificed its own security and independence.  
 
Policy Recommendation: Sanctions, Cooperation and Friendship 
While a great deal of this online debate has fueled and intensified this cultural confrontation, 
more and more Chinese netizens have started to offer their advice, which has rarely been seen in 
the past.36 Most of these policy recommendations are about taking hard-core foreign stances and 
 
33 Linkter Tang, comment on Li Ziqi, “The last episode of the “Life Series”: The life of white radish!” 
Mar.16, 2021. 
 
34 See note 33 above. 
 





36 The samples I coded in this section are from Weibo. 
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implementing economic sanctions. Despite the general anti-Korean sentiment, there are still some 
Chinese netizens who claim that China-Korea relations are so important that the Chinese 
government needs to deal with things carefully.  
When netizens bring up policies or speak of bilateral relations, it is sad to see that many of 
them view each other with distaste. Some Weibo posts observe that the military cooperation 
between South Korea and the US has damaged China’s interests, and that they are taking advantage 
of China in terms of trade and national security. Korean netizens point out that China is helping 
Kim Jong Un and North Korea. Moreover, this frequent cultural confrontation has made the 
bilateral relations more tenuous and fraught than ever before. Angry Chinese netizens call for harsh 
measures to make Korean learn a lesson. One post states: “China should impose economic 
sanctions on South Korea and stop importing Korean products . . . To be sure, Korean’s stealing 
Chinese culture is a big deal, which should be paid attention to. China should give it a heavy blow 
and make them learn from it.”37 Another post states, “I am a patriot. With regard to China-Korean 
relations, I suggest that China needs to keep status quo and don’t lift the ban on Korean culture 
products export.”38 A majority of Chinese netizens insist that economic sanction are a simple but 
effective method to stop Korean’s cultural appropriation. 
Along with those negative posts, there are some positive and rational voices. Some Chinese 
netizens underscore that China should take responsibility for protecting Chinese culture. They call 
for the promotion of Chinese culture through international platforms and social media, application 
 





38 H Xiaoningha (@ H Xiaoningha), “Some personal opinions,” Weibo, March.6, 2021, 
https://s.weibo.com/weibo?q=%E5%B0%B1%E6%83%B3%E5%8F%91%E8%A1%A8%E4%B8%AA%E4%BA%
BA%E8%A7%82%E7%82%B9&wvr=6&b=1&Refer=SWeibo_box. 
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of “Intangible Culture Heritage” for Chinese traditional festivals, foods, costumes, and other 
cultural products, and increased culture exchange between China and other countries. Through 
these means, there is no chance for Korea to appropriate Chinese culture. Other Chinese netizens 
declared that cooperation is vital for China-Korea development. A netizen reasons that “China and 
South Korea should learn from each other. We have similar food and traditions which are linking 
us together. I hope we are friends forever.”39 Besides, some Chinese netizens hoped that Chinese 
and Korean should respect history. One post states that “it is right for Korean to protect its own 
traditional culture, but it is also important to respect the history.”40 
Moreover, some Chinese netizens declare the Kimchi War is a misunderstanding and 
Chinese and Korean people should not take it seriously. The endless confrontation will only hurt 
feelings of both Chinese and Koreans. A few Chinese netizens defend Korean netizens: “Kimchi 
is Korean food and its unique food culture.”41 “Kimchi is Korean, Sushi is Japanese, Dumpling is 
Chinese. This is irrefutable.”42 “I think Kimchi is Korean food. Paocai in China is salty, but Kimchi 
is spicy.”43 These kind words may not stop the debate but will warm the hearts of Korean people. 
Hopefully, more positive voices from both sides will join in.  
 
Popular Narratives and China-Korea Relations 
 
39 Erxi Aichi Kaoya (@Erxi Aichi Kaoya), “My personal opinion,” Weibo, Jan.16. 2021, 
https://m.weibo.cn/5960976078/4594098881430368.  
 
40 Dentist Zhaoyong (@Koujiang zhongzhi yisheng zhaoyong), “respect the history,” Weibo, Jan.13, 2021, 
https://m.weibo.cn/7276014270/4592987184576330. 
 
41 Mefannnew (@Mefannnew), “Kimchi is Korean food, isn’t it?” Weibo, Jan.16, 2021, 
https://m.weibo.cn/7138148146/4594351139719642. 
 
42 Ninijiang (@ninijiang), “Kimchi is Korean,” Weibo, Jan.16, 2021, 
https://m.weibo.cn/1660641904/4594315597453141. 
 
43 Xiaomofang (@xiaomofang), “Kimchi is spicy,” Weibo, Jan.16, 2021, 
https://m.weibo.cn/6581225867/4594184155300639. 
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When looking at these various popular narratives, we see various dimensions, tones, and 
purposes to the comments. This is not surprising because the relationship between China and South 
Korea is complex due to the historical parallels and geographical proximity. With shared ethnicity 
and similar food and lifestyle, Chinese and Korean people have shared emotional bonds during 
thousands of years of trade and exchange. As the cultural center of the Asia Pacific region, China 
has a great influence on its neighbors in terms of politics, economy, culture, and lifestyle. The 
Korean political system and Korean culture were developed from the imperial examination system, 
Confucianism, Chinese characters, printing, food, and costumes. Chinese have gotten used to their 
sense of cultural superiority for hundreds of years, while Koreans have been trying to get rid of 
the label of “vassal state of Chinese culture.” Therefore, it is not difficult to understand the popular 
narratives in the “Kimchi War”: both sides’ negative attitudes towards the other shows that the 
battle to gain superiority is present in many aspects. At the same time, some positive perspectives 
offer hope for reconciliation.  
By analyzing several thousands of YouTube comments and Weibo posts, the popular 
narratives on the Kimchi War can be divided into two main groups: on one hand, the majority of 
Chinese and Korean netizens ridicule each other’s countries for cultural appropriation and 
ideology; on the other hand, a small number of Chinese netizens show their understanding of this 
cultural spat and their best hopes for long-lasting China-Korean relations.  
It is too early to say that China-Korea relations will deteriorate due to these negative 
popular narratives. However, these conflicting narratives can damage the national images of both 
countries. In Weibo, a majority of Chinese netizens are calling South Korea “the country of Thief” 
(Touguo), Korean people “people from country of thief.” The Chinese K-pop fans are called “fake 
Koreans” (er’bangzi) or traitors. Although the Chinese government doesn’t change its stance, it 
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has taken a series of measures on limiting the export of Korean products, which will accelerate the 
spread of anti-Korean sentiment in China. Similarly, the anti-China sentiment in Korea has been 
spreading. One post describes this phenomenon:  
South Korean have very specialized anti-China and anti-Japan education system and media 
industry . . . This is for specific political goals and this is why a lot of Korean always refuse 
to admit a lot of history facts. There are always some Korean shout and claim “north China 
belongs to Korean,” “Sushi& Kanji is from Korea.” . . . Now these people are come to Li 
Ziqi.44  
 
With the negative influence from popular narratives, very few Chinese and Korean netizens 
call for maintaining friendly bilateral relations. This lack of policy advocacy may be due to 
censorship and supervision and the suppression of positive opinions for political aims. 45  In 
addition, with a large amount of “fifty-cent party” online, the Chinese government is probably 
guiding popular narratives and creating an anti-Korean atmosphere. Chinese netizens might 
believe that making policy recommendations online will get them in trouble and have little impact 
on the official narratives. Therefore, they are not willing to voice their opinions, which they may 
see as useless.  
With direct mutual exchange decreasing, Chinese and Korean people’s impressions of each 
other will largely be from news and social media. The hostile atmosphere on social media does 
affect people’s perceptions in real life. Even worse, it creates prejudice or a negative first 
impression, which is not conducive to the future positive development of China-Korea relations 
and harmonious integration of the Asia Pacific region. 
It is difficult to say that the negative popular narratives will impact the Chinese 
government’s official stand because there are no obvious changes in foreign policies and official 
 
44 Mr. Left, comment on Li Ziqi, “The last episode of the “Life Series”: The life of white radish!” Mar.18, 
2021. 
 
45 Andrew Scobell, etc, 118.  
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statements due to these cultural confrontations. The Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua 
Chunying responded to the origin of Kimchi on Regular Press Conference on Jan. 20. She stated 
that “We support meaningful and friendly exchange and discussion over academic issues 
concerning paocai from a culinary perspective, but there should be no place for bias to avoid 
inciting confrontation and affecting people-to-people ties.”46  
However, some official accounts in Weibo owned or controlled by the Chinese government 
have contained different comments. CGTN, the official account of Chinese Global Television 
posted a video on January 12 with the title of “with regard to the Korean netizens’ criticism on Li 
Ziqi and her video, who should keep a cool head?” The video claims that “While some South 
Korean netizens consider kimchi to be a unique dish originated from their country, Chinese pickles, 
in fact, have a long history that dates back to 1100 B.C. during the Zhou Dynasty.”47 Guanchazhe 
Net, the official account of state-owned newspaper Guanchazhe.com, posted on January 11, 
Korea, as the “country of Kimchi”, relied on the import of Kimchi from China and more 
and more housewives gave up making kimchi at home because of the rising prices of 
Kimchi. Some Korean media called it the humiliation of Korea, which may be the reason 
of why Korean netizens are so sensitive about Li Ziqi’s video.48 
 
The Sina Finance published a commentary that states “it is meaningless to debate over the origin 
of Kimchi because that the Kimchi is originated from China is a hard fact.”49 Those comments 
reflect that to some extent, the official stand is affected by the popular narratives. Those posts from 
 
46 Chunying, Hua, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying's Regular Press Conference on January 
20, 2021,” accessed on April 8, 2021, 
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1847552.shtml. 
 
47 CGTN (@CGTN), “with regard to the Korean netizens’ criticism on Li Ziqi and her video, who should 
keep a cool head?”, Weibo, Jan. 12, https://m.weibo.cn/3173633817/4592656938698825. 
 
48 Guanchazhe Net (@Guanchazhe Net), “Kimchi is our food: Korean netizens criticized Li Ziqi for making 
Kimchi in her video,” Weibo, Jan. 11, https://m.weibo.cn/1887344341/4592255790745034. 
 
49 Sina Finance (@sinafinance), “80% Kimchi imported by Korea is from this small town in Shandong, 
China,” Weibo, Jan. 11, https://m.weibo.cn/1638782947/4592534309835266. 
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state-owned media proved that in the era of social media, the Chinese government needs to pay 




With the influence of social media, the popular narratives affect policymaking and China-
Korea relations to various degrees, but the pressure generated by posts and comments does not yet 
seem to have significant implications on the Chinese government’s standpoint or actions when 
dealing with China-Korea relations. Nevertheless, in many ways, the Chinese government attaches 
much importance to these popular narratives, and their responses always have the CPC siding with 
the Chinese people. In terms of China-Korea relations, the Chinese government may use the 
popular narratives to show public anger about the Korean government, which makes it more likely 
for them to gain advantages in bilateral negotiations.  
By analyzing major discourse on social media, we see that most of the narratives focus on 
cultural appropriation and only a small portion of them attack ideological differences, which 
hopefully won’t cause substantial damage to the emotions and psyches of Chinese and Korean 
people. If this is indeed the case, then China-Korea relations will not be greatly influenced by those 
negative popular narratives. More importantly, China needs to keep good relations with South 
Korea due to strategic considerations as well as economic and political partnerships. The influence 
of Korean culture—in terms of food and culture—can’t be dismissed. In contemporary times, this 
massive influence is demonstrated through K-pop, a genre with power that can’t be erased by 
online conflicts or music-based regulations. Millions of Chinese people are obsessed with K-
dramas, K-beauty, K-music, and Korean food. K-pop has been changing the Chinese lifestyle for 
decades. Similarly, Korean society is deeply influenced by Chinese culture for thousands of years. 
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At present, there are more and more cultural frictions hindering the potential for friendly mutual 
exchanges, but I believe shared culture and common strategic interests will connect the Chinese 
and Korean people closely once again.  
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